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It is appropriate, thirty-six years after the publication of None Is Too Many, 
to reconsider 1944 from the perspective of Canadian Jewry. As Canadians, they 
were swept up in the war eﬀort, at home and in combat. As Jews, they were 
frantic about the destruction of Jewish life. In consideration of the questions raised 
in the title of this paper, we present, somewhat in contrast to Abella and Troper, 
the following assessment. First, the organized Jewish community, in the context of 
Canadian ethno-cultural minorities, had a voice. Second that information about the 
Holocaust, while often inaccurate, was widely published, especially in the Yiddish 
press. Third, that despite Canada’s complete abdication of political will in providing 
opportunities for Jews to flee Europe and find a refuge in Canada, the reality of 
the war, the absence of historical precedent, and the impossibility of foreseeing the 
calamity, ensured that a comprehensive plan of meaningful rescue could not have 
been attempted, let alone considered.
Il est approprié, trente-quatre ans après la publication de None Is Too Many, 
de reconsidérer l’année 1944 du point de vue de la communauté juive canadienne. 
En tant que Canadiens, ils ont été emportés dans l’eﬀort de guerre, à la maison 
et au front. En tant que Juifs, ils ont été terrifiés par la destruction de la vie juive 
européenne. En considération des questions soulevées dans le titre de cet article, nous 
présentons une évaluation qui nuance celle d’Abella et de Troper. Premièrement, 
la communauté juive organisée, dans le contexte des minorités ethnoculturelles 
canadiennes, a eu une voix. Deuxièmement, les informations sur l’Holocauste, 
bien que souvent inexactes, ont été largement publiées, en particulier dans la presse 
yiddish. Troisièmement, malgré l’abdication totale de la volonté politique du Canada 
de donner la possibilité aux Juifs de fuir l’Europe et de trouver refuge au Canada, la 
réalité de la guerre, l’absence de précédent historique, et l’impossibilité de prévoir la 
calamité ont assuré qu’un plan complet de sauvetage significatif n’aurait pas pu être 
considéré, encore moins tenté.
The year 1944 was calamitous in the equilibrium of global events. It marked both 
the denouement of Axis control of Europe and Eastern Asia and the penultimate 
stage of the Holocaust. In Canada, the country was riven by the Conscription Crisis, 
fixated on the war eﬀort at home and abroad, and apprehensive about the prospect 
for a rapid victory in light of the Allied invasion of Europe. For Canadian Jewry, their 
apprehension was multiplied by the fate of their European brothers and sisters. They 
received irregular and often inaccurate information about the genocide, and their 
community leaders were stonewalled in their entreaties to the King government to 
alleviate the crisis of Jewish refugees by withdrawing the restrictions to emigrate. 
Our understanding of the tenor of Canadian Jewry in 1944 is largely due to Irving 
Abella and Harold Troper’s None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 
published in 1982. Indeed, the title has become a catch phrase to rally Canadians to 
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open the country’s door to refugees, from the Vietnamese boat people at the time of 
the publication of the author’s initial research1 to the recent adoption of Syrian exiles. 
Nevertheless, a reconsideration of 1944, in light of the voluminous research on the 
Holocaust and on Canadian Jewry since 1982, complicates these authors’ perspectives. 
We raise four questions regarding the plight of European Jewry and the response by 
Canada’s Jews and by Canadians: What was known? What was reported? What was 
done? What could have been done? The first two questions are not congruent. What 
was reported to Canadian oﬃcials via London and Washington was not necessarily 
believed. What was reported to Canadians was not necessarily accurate. The greater 
complication, however, was the enormous gap between the knowledge that European 
Jewry was being decimated, and the comprehension of what that entailed, a gap that 
took some thirty years to resolve. The third question is viewed from two perspectives 
- the Canadian government and the Jewish community. There is no deviation from 
Abella and Troper’s assertion that there was no intent or eﬀort by the authorities to 
oﬀer a haven to European Jewry, and that Canadian Jews took up the mantle to save 
their brethren. Nevertheless, we question Abella and Troper’s contention that the 
Jewish community “had no leverage.”2 But that conversation doesn’t consider the 
fourth question - that even had there been political will, only a miniscule fraction of 
the intended victims could have been rescued. 
Consequently, we oﬀer three points. First, the Canadian Jewish community in 1944 was 
unrivalled in its organization and its access to political leaders in comparison to other 
ethno-cultural minorities. Second, while information about the genocide tended 
to be inaccurate and in some respects withheld from Canadians, the broad strokes 
of the destruction of European Jewry was well known, especially via the Yiddish 
language press. Finally, while there was no Canadian response to the genocide, any 
hope of saving even a remnant of European Jewry was negligible, given the context 
of the war and the absence of historical precedent for such action. Aside from the 
gaps between information and belief, and between knowledge and comprehension, 
it would have taken a prophet to foresee the enormity of the Holocaust.
We open with an overview of Canada’s Jews, Canadian society, and the war in 
Europe, in 1944. There were approximately 170,000 Jews in Canada, representing 
about 1.5 percent of the populace. Some 85 percent lived in Montreal, Toronto, and 
Winnipeg, but several hundred communities had at least one Jewish resident. Due 
to the increasingly stringent immigration restrictions in the interwar period, a slight 
majority was born in Canada. The community had a wide array of organizations 
to which members belonged, from synagogues, landsmanshaften, local federations, 
political/social/labour/Zionist groups, B’nai Brith, and the Canadian Jewish Congress 
(CJC). CJC was reborn in 1934 and by the start of the war had become the most 
important voice in the community and arguably the strongest ethno-cultural 
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advocacy organization in the country. By 1939, when it was headed by Samuel 
Bronfman who provided financial support and his prominent voice, it had some 
measure of impact on the national agenda. Together with B’nai Brith, CJC formed 
the Joint Community Relations Committee in 1938 and became an influential agency 
for human rights.
Anti-Semitism had eﬄoresced in the interwar period; that restricted access to 
education, housing, accessibility to public spaces, and - most significantly - to 
employment. Traditional religious anti-Semitism was most felt by Quebec’s Jews 
and was accelerated within the growing nationalist movement. In the West, nativist 
movements were on the rise and had gained ascendancy in Alberta. Across the 
country, neo-fascists supported Germany and Italy, especially with regard to their 
condemnation of Jews.3 Yet, one must understand the context of anti-Semitism within 
the broad scope of attitudes and practices inflicted on other minorities. Japanese 
Canadians were dispossessed and incarcerated. South and East Asian immigration 
had long been suppressed, and First Nations were victims of cultural genocide.4 
Negative attitudes toward Canada’s Jews were also expressed about other ethnic 
Europeans, but Jews were in the process of adapting and acculturating themselves to 
Canadian life more rapidly than these groups. One indication of this adjustment was 
that 16,000 Jewish men and women served in the Armed Forces, a ratio just under 
the national average. In part, enlistment was spurred by CJC’s formation of the War 
Eﬀort Committee of CJC.5
In examining the history of the Holocaust in 1944, we see that the knowledge of what 
was taking place tended to be inaccurate or disregarded. By the fall of 1943, Germany 
was in retreat in the Soviet Union, and the Allies had gained a foothold in southern 
Italy and repelled the Axis powers in North Africa. Through the first half of 1944, 
German forces had retreated to central prewar Poland, and were fighting the Allied 
invasion in France. By the end of the year, Germany was facing a pincer movement, 
and Italy had fallen. 
With regard to the plight of the Jews, by the fall of 1943, the only remaining major 
ghetto was Lodz, and the only remaining “extermination” (to use the German term) 
facility was the Auschwitz/Birkenau complex. The other sites, Treblinka, Belzec, 
and Sobibor, had been razed. The final transports from Western Europe occurred 
through the spring of 1944. The only unaﬀected Jewish community was in Hungary, 
but with the German takeover, in short order some 500,000-565,000 Jews were killed, 
representing 87 percent of the community. The Lodz ghetto was liquidated at the 
end of August, and Auschwitz was abandoned in January 1945. The final stage of 
the Holocaust was the death marches into prewar Germany, where most of the last 
fragment of the victims met their end.6
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The major obstacles to providing information about the Holocaust ranged from 
geography (the occurrences in Central and Eastern Europe) to the context of the war 
(no western Allied forces in trans-Alpine Europe until D-Day), relegating the plight 
of the Jews far behind the determination to defeat Germany, disbelief, and anti-
Semitism. Canada’s Ministry of External Aﬀairs received information via London, 
so that it knew of Jews trapped in Vichy France in 1941, of the deportations from 
the Warsaw Ghetto in 1942, of mass murder in the Soviet Union and Lithuania in 
1942, and of accounts of the destruction of Hungarian Jewry in the summer of 1944. 
However, some of these reports were either outdated or inaccurate. For example, 
in May 1944, one report stated that “there were 300,000 Polish Jews alive, as many 
or more in the USSR,” and it also spoke of the “deportation of Hungarian Jews to 
Auschwitz and Treblinka” in 1944, even though Treblinka was gradually shut down 
after August 1943. 
In addition, eyewitness accounts were discounted. Two examples are cited. Jan Karski, 
a courier for the Polish government in exile, smuggled himself into Poland and 
saw the deportations from the Warsaw Ghetto to Treblinka; he also learned of the 
gassing at Chelmno and of the mass murder in conjunction with the invasion of the 
Soviet Union. His reports in London were scoﬀed at by British oﬃcials, and similarly 
by American leaders when Karski went to Washington.7 The murder of Hungarian 
Jews was witnessed and recorded by Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler, Auschwitz 
inmates who escaped. Their report, dubbed the Auschwitz Protocols, reached the 
World Jewish Congress in Switzerland. Even so, they were disregarded by the Allied 
Command. Nevertheless, the Jewish Labour Committee published them, and they 
were disseminated to independent journalists.8
What did Canadians know about the Holocaust? For readers of the Toronto Star, the 
reports by Pierre Von Paassen told of the hardships of Polish Jews from the German 
invasion through the war. He beseeched the King administration to provide a haven, 
a lone cry in the wilderness. But the paper’s coverage was not consistent, and it 
was entirely absent in 1941 and 1942. Liberty Magazine reported in November 1943 of 
the mass murder in Babi Yar which had occurred two years earlier, and it reported 
on Treblinka, Belzec, and Sobibor, which had already been destroyed. Although 
Canadian leaders had authenticated accounts of systematic mass murder during the 
summer of 1943, they were not made public. Similarly, although CJC had reports of 
the gas chamber complexes in 1942 - shortly after they were erected - and reports 
of the May 1943 liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto in September 1943, it chose to 
keep them under wraps, perhaps because of fear of inflaming anti-Jewish reactions, 
because they would not (or could not) be authenticated and/or believed.9
What did Canadian Jews know? To begin, it depended upon whether they read the 
Jewish press in English or in Yiddish. While the Canadian Jewish Chronicle (which 
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shared its oﬃce with the Keneder Adler) published reports well in advance of the 
English press, Winnipeg’s Jewish Post did so in less depth, and the Canadian Jewish 
Review was virtually silent, perhaps of fear of anti-Jewish reprisals. The Yiddish 
press, however, was not bound by such consideration as it provided regular reports, 
often from non-governmental sources, including the Karski investigations. 
Even so, information in the Yiddish press was occasionally distorted. This was most 
notable in the reports by Raymond Davies to the Adler from Lublin (which had fallen 
to the Red Army) in October 1944. He wrote that in the nearby Majdanek camp, 
approximately one million Jews and half a million others were killed. In fact, the 
total was approximately 200,000 victims, two-thirds of whom were Jewish.10 He told 
of the liberation of Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka. These camps were not liberated. 
German troops destroyed them a year or more earlier, in part to cover the evidence 
of the atrocities. There were few “eyewitnesses” as there were a handful of escapees 
from Treblinka, and almost none from the other two. Nevertheless, as Rebecca 
Margolis argues in this volume, “the destruction of European Jewry under the Nazis 
was the story in all facets of the country’s three major Yiddish newspapers.”11 The fact 
remains that those who wanted to know could know, even if the reportage was not 
necessarily up to the minute or completely accurate. 
But what did they comprehend? Separated by time and space from their lands of 
origin, it was diﬃcult to appreciate that a millennial Jewish civilization had been 
destroyed. In fact, in the spring of 1944, when some five million had already been 
murdered, reports of gas chambers in Auschwitz were incomprehensible not only 
to the world, but those about to be ensnared. One telling example was the refusal 
of the Jews of Sighet (on the Hungarian/Romanian frontier), at the height of the 
transports, to believe what was happening - as depicted by Elie Wiesel.12 Many 
survivors maintain that even they could not comprehend the calamity. In studies 
of Canadian survivors, this theme was not a marginal one. If “comprehension” was 
ephemeral among some of the 30,000 survivors who migrated to Canada between 
1947 and 1956, it was more pronounced for many Jews born or raised in Canada. This 
was a factor in the chasm of understanding between the two groups, one that only 
came to be ameliorated to a degree some thirty years after the war. For some, that 
gap never narrowed.13
How did Canadian Jews respond? The short answer is that they responded with 
vigour and determination. In its reorganization in 1934, the Canadian Jewish Congress 
was hampered by competition between its Montreal and Toronto factions, lessening 
the eﬀectiveness of its advocacy. This changed with Samuel Bronfman’s accession 
as president and the appointment of Saul Hayes as its director. CJC became focused 
on the main concern and proceeded to directly lobby Mackenzie King. By 1944, it 
pleaded with the government to participate in a British scheme to rescue Hungarian 
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children, to no avail. Troper and Abella maintained that the Jewish leadership was 
powerless, a view that I supported in 2000, calling it “timorous.” 
As I began actively studying, teaching, and writing Canadian Jewish history after 
the publication of Delayed Impact under the supervision of Irving Abella, I revised 
my position. I looked at the context of Canadian attitudes towards all non-Anglo-
Celtic/Northern European immigrants. The “one wailing cry” was not confined 
to Canadian Jews. I further looked at the pressure in a variety forms by Canadian 
Jews, from the CJC to individuals, and with respect to the former, to the access to 
King and his acolytes. This is astonishing relative to the absence of any influence 
on government policies by Canada’s most aggrieved minorities. What other ethno-
cultural minority had a direct pipeline to Ottawa? Or had three Jewish Members of 
Parliament? It wasn’t a lack of Jewish advocacy that prevented King from responding 
to the crisis. Meanwhile, the pressure wasn’t exercised by Bronfman and Hayes 
alone. The Federation of Polish Jews, numerous landsmanschaften, the Jewish Labour 
Committee, the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society, and certainly the Yiddish language 
press were vociferous in their appeals and ultimately in their condemnation of the 
government’s refusal to respond.14
What was done? Very little. Abella and Troper maintain that only 5,000 Jews were 
allowed to enter Canada between 1933 and 1945. In a recent article, Justin Comartin 
looks at Louis Rosenberg’s research, rather than the internal correspondence of 
the Immigration Branch, upon which Abella and Troper relied for their figure.15 
Comartin concludes that the number of arrivals was 8,787. While this hardly counts 
as an inspiring response to the crisis, it indicates that Canada’s record was marginally 
less appalling.
But asking what was done masks the far greater and complex question of what could 
have been done. The main barrier is that we read history backwards. As such, we 
expect that Canada “in the free and civilized world,” to borrow Abella and Troper’s 
phrase,16 should have foreseen the destruction of European Jewry. If so, how? Where 
was the precedent? Historians of the Holocaust have debated whether the Nazi Party 
intended the murder of the Jews of Europe all along or ended up doing so as a function 
of internal competition between the Party, the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and 
the industrialists. Even so, it wasn’t until the summer or fall of 1941 (depending on the 
historian) that the decision to annihilate was taken. This could not have been foreseen 
in 1933, at Kristallnacht, or at the invasion of Poland, nor could it have even been 
comprehensible when the decision was enacted.
A second limiting factor for rescue comes back to what was known and what was 
comprehended. To which we add, what was possible. By the summer of 1941, by 
what means could the masses of Jews - or even tens of thousands of them - have 
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been saved? Germany and its allies and accomplices had control of Europe from the 
Atlantic to the Russian steppes. By what means could rescue have taken place? Hence, 
our concentration is limited to those trapped in Vichy, who could possibly smuggle 
themselves to Iberia.17 The third factor is the lack of precedent. When had nations 
banded together to save a nation that was being annihilated? Further, when had an 
entire nation/people/religion been designated for annihilation?18 Fifty years after the 
end of the war - in a world of instant communication, of a United Nations - one 
nation, the Tutsis, were almost wiped out in the span of ten weeks using primitive 
weapons. There was a precedent in 1994 - the Holocaust - and there was a means - 
political will in the Western world. But neither the precedent nor the means were 
acted upon.
Nevertheless, it is important to separate the limiting factors for rescue from the 
openly anti-Jewish sentiments of the Canadian authorities and much of Canadian 
society as a whole. One need only look at the refusal to admit survivors to Canada 
until there was pressure from industrialists for workers to meet the demands of 
the postwar economy. Even so, it wasn’t until 1950 that the barriers to entry for the 
survivors were fully withdrawn. 
The year 1944 was a turning point in history. European Jewry had vanished. Canadian 
Jews tried mightily to mitigate the slaughter, even though reports were inaccurate 
and more prolific only in the Yiddish-language press. Canadian society was totally 
focused on the Depression and the war, and it was historically hostile to non-Anglo 
immigrants and their descendants, and to its First Nations. Its leadership saw no 
political advantage in helping save even a fragment of European Jewry. Even had 
there been the political will to engage in rescue, Axis control from the Atlantic to the 
Russian steppes, the absence of precedent, and the impossibility of reading history 
forward all conspired to dash a meaningful rescue. Although Canadian Jews only 
came to appreciate the magnitude of the Holocaust decades after the cataclysm, their 
eﬀorts to support their brethren were laudable, and they continue to be documented 
by this generation of scholars.
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